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renewable energy in Asia?
Tim Forsyth
Summary
• Technology transfer for climate change mitigation needs to focus on the
diffusion of existing technologies as well as the innovation of technologies.
• Diffusion requires full involvement of non-state actors, particularly
business investors in new and renewable energy technologies and the local
communities who adopt technologies.
• This paper presents advice about how partnerships between investors and
communities can accelerate technology transfer by reducing investors’ costs
and making technologies more relevant to local development. Partnerships
are based on a combination of creating assurance mechanisms, reducing
transaction costs, and building trust and accountability.
• Capacity-building and enabling environments for technology transfer
therefore have to include building these partnerships between investors and
host communities.
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Introduction
In June 2004, the Expert Group on Technology Transfer
(EGTT)1 of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) urged an important new
approach to international technology transfer. Since its
establishment in 2001 at the climate change meeting in
Marrakesh, the group has built capacity for the supply
of new technologies, especially through innovation
and development strategies involving partnerships
between governments and private companies. 
But in June 2004, business members of the EGTT
called for a more diverse approach (UNFCC, 2004). They
claimed that so far the group had tended to focus too
exclusively on the supply of technologies, and on
activities involving governments or international
organizations. Instead, they urged that more attention
be given to the business needs of companies who
distribute environmental technologies. Moreover, they
suggested that the group needed to acknowledge
technology ‘diffusion’ as an important process
alongside innovation and development. In essence,
they recommended that more attention should be
given to the demand-led aspects of technology
transfer, which in turn required greater capacity-
building in the interactions of non-state actors such as
companies and host communities.
This Briefing Paper summarizes new thinking on
ways to enhance technology transfer through the
interactions of investors and communities. In particular,
it analyses different approaches to ‘partnerships’
between companies and communities. It calls upon the
EGTT and UNFCCC to focus more upon how to make
partnerships successful, as a crucial way to ensure that
technology transfer can proceed.
The paper describes the potential contribution of
partnerships to technology transfer. It then illustrates
this with examples of investment in renewable energy
and waste-to-energy technologies in India, the
Philippines and Thailand. Finally, it draws lessons for
capacity-building, community involvement and
‘enabling environments’ for technology transfer, as
currently discussed under the UNFCCC and United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
The problems of technology
transfer
‘Technology transfer’ is well known to be an important
but controversial topic within international
environmental negotiations (IPCC, 2000). In
environmental terms, technology transfer refers to the
need to encourage the adoption of new, clean
technologies in countries or locations where such
technology is not yet commonplace. Some developing
countries refused to sign the UNFCCC and Agenda 21
before developed countries had stated some
commitment to technology transfer.
Achieving technology transfer, however, has been
difficult for various well-documented reasons (see
Forsyth, 1999). First, technology transfer is difficult to
define. Companies do not engage in ‘technology
transfer’ as such, but instead with ‘leases,’ ‘contracts’ or
‘joint ventures,’ all of which may include scope for
encouraging technology use in new locations but are
aimed primarily at increasing business access. Secondly,
most environmental technology is now privately
owned, and few companies wish to share it without
compensation. Third, long-term technology transfer is
costly, and requires training local people to use and
maintain technologies; few companies wish to do this,
and often see it as the responsibility of international
organizations or official development assistance.
Fourth, it is sometimes difficult to agree on what is
‘environmental technology,’ and technologies have
varying environmental impacts for different
stakeholders. Furthermore, many technologies in
developing countries may also have environmental
benefits and be more appropriate to end-users than
some imports. Fifth, despite environmental benefits,
some technologies have proved inappropriate for local
users and have consequently been abandoned. Sixth,
many programmes of technology transfer have failed
to acknowledge the need for long-term financial
security and cost-recovery by investing companies:
companies require regular repayment of costs, which
may require the establishment of new accounting and
financial bodies locally to achieve this. In addition, the
common use of subsidies as an incentive to adopt new
technologies has frequently backfired by creating
short-term and unsustainable economic conditions that
have repelled both investors and consumers.
Consequently, ‘technology transfer’ is not one
simple process but the conjunction of various acts, over
a long time, for a wide range of products and services.
Technology has to be appropriate: it has to be seen to
be useful by local people, or in tune with other local
products and markets. (For example, one United
Nations project in India in the 1970s to introduce
electricity generators using cow dung failed to predict
that the price of dung would increase, leading to a
shortage of fuel. In the Philippines in the 1980s,
photovoltaic-powered water pumps were seen to be
unnecessarily complicated compared with pre-existing
hand-pumps, and hence abandoned). Technology
requires financial management: there is little point
encouraging private investors to sell new technology
or engage with other companies in joint ventures if
they cannot guarantee long-term recovery of costs.
(For example, the development agency Winrock
International transferred new wind turbines in remote
parts of eastern Indonesia by creating locally controlled
financial management organizations in villages
(‘distributed utilities’ ). Technology therefore requires
both hardware (equipment) and software
(management, training, education) that allow new
technologies to be adopted on a long-term basis on
terms acceptable to both investors and users.
Technology transfer also includes partnerships with
local companies and citizens in order to supply
components and labour, and to gain understanding of
products. 
Moreover, some analysts have suggested that
technology transfer may follow two main paths.
Vertical technology transfer involves the relocation (or
sale) of technology products without the sharing of
intellectual property, usually by the granting of sole
production rights to one investor, or the simple sale of
finished products to consumers in a new location.
Horizontal technology transfer involves the long-term
sharing of intellectual property, usually via a joint
venture or cooperation between foreign direct investor
and a domestic company in the host country. Most
discussions of technology transfer in international
meetings to date have implied horizontal transfer. But
increasingly, vertical transfer has been proposed as a
way to enhance international technology transfer
without risking intellectual property rights or high
costs as described above.
Approaches to technology transfer
under the UNFCCC and UNEP
Since the signing of Agenda 21 and UNFCCC in 1992,
various organizations have sought to create enabling
environments for technology transfer. But approaches
have often differed according to whether participants
are from developed or developing countries (UNFCCC,
2003b:4). In general terms, many developing countries
have wanted richer countries to facilitate technology
transfer by stimulating the supply of technologies via
mechanisms such as government-to-government
transfers, or increasing financial and technical support,
primarily through horizontal forms of technology
transfer. Many developed countries, however, have
pointed to the need to create incentive mechanisms for
private companies which own technologies, and
sufficient protection of intellectual property rights for
investors. Such debates have been seen in relation to
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which was
created in 1997 to allow Annex I (i.e. developed)
countries to achieve some proportion of emissions
targets through climate-friendly investment in non-
Annex I (usually developing) countries.
In 2000, a special report from the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000)
identified technology transfer as a five-stage process,
including assessment, agreement, implementation,
evaluation and adjustment, and replication (diffusion)
of both technological ‘hardware’ and ‘software.’ But
since then, most attention has been given to state- and
supply-led initiatives, rather than those that involve
interactions of investors and communities. In the 2001
Marrakesh Accords, the UNFCCC stated: ‘the enabling
environments component of the framework focuses on
government actions, such as fair trade policies, removal
of technical, legal and administrative barriers to
technology transfer, sound economic policy, regulatory
frameworks and transparency, all of which create an
environment conducive to private and public sector
technology transfer’ (UNFCCC, 2001: 65). Indeed, the
Marrakesh Accords also created an ‘adaptation fund’ as
part of the CDM to raise money to conduct long-term
assistance in developing countries, such as horizontal
technology transfer. But this was criticized by some
observers for effectively taxing CDM investment and
failing to ensure that technology transfer (either
horizontal or vertical) could be included as a
prerequisite in CDM projects as a matter of course.2
Later statements by the UNFCCC have reiterated
the role for government action by listing activities such
as providing information, financial flows, and
improving legal frameworks. SBSTA has been closely
involved in developing a technology information
system (TT: CLEAR3), including an inventory of the
Energy Saving Trust (EST) and projects. However,
making contact with end users of technology has
largely been left to socially concerned NGOs. In 2003,
the UNFCCC asserted: ‘governments can create
enabling environments for EST diffusion and transfer if
they endorse the importance of socially and
environmentally oriented organizations and mandate
social impact assessments for technology transfer
projects’ (2003b:16). Such statements, of course,
indicate the valuable role played by intermediary
NGOs, but fall short of acknowledging the commercial
needs and interactions that drive non-state actors to
engage in practices that result in ‘technology transfer’.
Similarly, a further UNFCCC technical paper (UNFCCC,
2003a: 4) adopts a state-led perspective; its assertion
that ‘transferring experience, knowledge, skills and
Partnerships for Technology Transfer 3
BOX 1: UNIVERSAL CRITICAL SUCCESS
FACTORS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT
1. Investment must fit the medium-term 
strategy of energy development.
2. Investment must use proven or reliable 
designs.
3. Projects must be based on least-cost 
approaches.
4. Appropriate finance must be arranged to 
cover risks.
5. There must be adequate marketing and 
technical staff.
6. There must be a proven market for the 
technology.
7. Do not give free gifts or overt subsidies 
(such as short-term grants).
8. Ensure that a market chain exists between 
suppliers and consumers.
9. Consider site-specific factors in each 
location.
Source: Forsyth (1999), after Stainforth and Staunton (1996).
10.  Operate in locations where regulations and 
 laws are favourable.
11.  Create an acceptable tariff structure to cover 
 costs.
12.  Disseminate programme results to create 
 market demand.
13.  Conduct adequate project reviews to 
 identify weak points.
14.  Expect demand for products to grow once 
 established.
practices is “capacity-building”’ suggests that end users
may not have their own existing capacities to be
strengthened.
Other work by the IPCC and UNEP has focused
explicitly on community involvement. But these
approaches have not always been complementary. In
its special report on technology transfer, one chapter
(written by different teams of authors) urged greater
involvement of host communities in both shaping and
monitoring technology transfer:  ‘participatory
development is now widely recognized as a way of
achieving technology transfer at all levels of
development endeavor’ (IPCC, 2000:1174). Yet, in a
later chapter, other authors downplay community
consultation: ‘technology transfer… will be most
effective where it engages all key stakeholders in
designing and implementing technology transfer
actions. The key stakeholders include in-country and
international private businesses and investors,
government agencies, and bilateral and multilateral
donor organizations’ (IPCC, 2000:1635).
Meanwhile, statements by UNEP have reiterated
the need for a participatory approach. ‘Participation of
the community, and its partnerships with other
stakeholders, has become an important component of
all environmental programmes and projects, both in
terms of subsidiarity of decision-making processes, and
of creating an enabling environment for the
community to have a say over aspects that affect their
lives’ (UNEP, 2004: 1). But statements so far have
tended to indicate how far local or national
governments can act to increase local participation in
predefined environmental objectives, rather than
allowing citizens to participate in making new
technologies appropriate. UNEP (2004: 4) declares:
‘community participation means a readiness on the
part of both local governments and citizens to accept
equal responsibilities and activities in managing their
surroundings’ and ‘community participation calls for
clear commitment and involvement of all members of a
community in various joint activities’ (UNEP, 2004: 5).
The first of these statements seems to suggest that
communities might share the same vision of
environmental priorities as governments. The second
suggests that ‘communities’ may be homogeneous and
think alike. Neither is likely to be true. Accordingly,
there is a need to acknowledge greater diversity of
needs and people within communities before seeing
how they can interact with private companies.
The next section considers some ways to
understand these kinds of non-state partnerships. In
particular, partnerships can help overcome problems of
technology diffusion by reducing investors’ costs, and
by increasing the ability of citizens to determine the
uses of technology.
The potential of partnerships
The first section of this paper explained that successful
technology transfer requires cost recovery for investors,
and the perception that technology is appropriate and
useful by local communities. The second section argued
that formal approaches to capacity-building by the
UNFCC have not sufficiently considered non-state
activities; this section asks: ‘how can partnerships
between investors and local communities help
technology transfer’?
Partnerships may take many forms, and may
include collaboration between investors and local
companies, local governments and citizen groups.
Sometimes, collaborating with citizens may also include
working with local companies in order to gain both
local supplies and local trust. Public–private
partnerships between private companies and
governments are already well established as a fast way
to provide infrastructure in rapidly industrializing
countries. This kind of partnership may involve a Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme (or similar versions),
enabling companies to construct infrastructure and
operate it profitably for a limited number of years
before ownership is given to the government. But in
recent years, a broader definition of ‘policy
partnership’ has emerged to describe greater
collaboration between governments, investors and
citizens. These partnerships have been encouraged
under the United Nation’s Global Compact and
Millennium Development Goals as a way to harness the
vast resources of international private investment, as
well as allowing end users greater consultation in how
development projects evolve. But can partnerships exist
at lower levels between individual investors and
localities? What do successful partnerships look like?
We first consider the needs of business, and then of
citizens.
(i) Partnerships and business needs
As discussed above, investors want few technical
barriers to investment; large consumer demand for
their products; little resistance to their technology; and
a financial system that allows long-term cost recovery.
Conceptually, partnerships using these factors can be
summarized in terms of transaction costs and assurance
mechanisms (Weber, 1998). Transaction costs may be
defined as costs of interaction (such as financial cost,
time in negotiating with different actors); and
assurance mechanisms may be defined as contracts,
laws or expectations (formal or otherwise) which
ensure that collaboration or partnerships will provide
each party with their desired result. An ideal
partnership between actors should have minimum
transaction costs, and maximum assurance mechanisms
(see Box 2). It should be noted, however, that the
emergence of successful partnerships varies according
to several factors, including willingness to cooperate;
long-standing trust of each party; and a shared or
compatible perception of the underlying problem.
Also, the ability to collaborate may vary between other
companies, and between local citizen groups.
(ii) Partnerships and community needs
For their part, local citizens want technology that is
appropriate (useful for their needs and circumstances),
easily understood and seen to have few risks for
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health, safety or local economic development. Local
collaboration with investors has been called
‘cooperative environmental governance’ by some
analysts (e.g. Glasbergen, ed., 1998). This refers to a
system of decision-making about environmental
technology and investment that includes participation
of local citizens, and the search for mutual objectives
between investors and communities. Such partnerships
are usually characterized by clear – and unanimously
agreed – objectives of investment and technology; the
existence of clear and accountable negotiating arenas
where all citizens can express views; and, frequently,
the existence of help from government departments
(such as environmental agencies) to provide
environmental and technical expertise.
Yet critics have proposed, first, that the notion of a
single ‘community’ is flawed because of the variety of
people and social groups within locations such as cities
in developing countries: it is therefore difficult to allow
local partnerships that include all citizens on an equal
basis. In the context of this paper, some examples of
people who are difficult to represent in partnerships
are waste pickers, or people who segregate municipal
waste in developing-world cities. Secondly, critics have
claimed that few partnerships are conducted without
some element of bias and co-option of citizens: local
elites may have links to businesses or government
agencies. Third, some have suggested that reaching
truly local partnerships is impossible because citizens
are frequently influenced, or represented, by activist
groups such as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) or campaigning groups that have national or
international links. Indeed, some NGOs such as
Greenpeace have in recent years opened offices in
Asian cities and adopted international campaigns
against toxic pollution.
Because of these concerns, some critics assert that
partnerships between citizens and investors may
actually reduce the ability for local citizens to influence
investment in their locality, and that partnerships are
perhaps less preferable to full state regulation. This
paper, however, seeks to assess the
possibility of making local partnerships
between investors in environmental
technology with local communities,
and to see if it is possible to overcome
these difficulties and achieve a new
form of environmental policy that can
transfer technology, reduce investors’
costs and provide new services for
citizens.
Case study: waste-to-
energy investment in
Asia
Waste-to-energy is both controversial
and topical. Municipal waste is
growing in many developing-world
cities: locally it is the source of disease
and pollution; globally it causes
methane emissions through
decomposing organic matter. Methane
is an important greenhouse gas because it has 23 times
the global warming potential of carbon dioxide. Using
waste to generate electricity may reduce waste totals
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions as well as
generating badly needed energy for industrialization.
Burning agricultural waste to produce energy has long
been practised in many places. Critics, however, suggest
that municipal waste-to-energy is controversial because
it may make planners tolerant of waste, rather than
seeking to reduce it. Moreover, the choice of
technology for waste-to-energy is important:
incinerating municipal waste (including using newer
technologies such as pyrolysis7) emits potentially
dangerous dioxins because it burns most waste
material, including plastics. But biomethanation of
municipal waste (or so-called anaerobic digestion) uses
only the organic fraction of the waste, and involves no
burning. Biomethanation therefore promises methane
extraction (for electricity generation), a residual sludge
(used for composting), and the potential to recycle the
remaining municipal waste. At present, many investors
are using both incineration and biomethanation to
claim financial rewards under the climate change
agreement, although critics are working to ban
incineration from this process.
Waste-to-energy is a good example of the
construction of partnerships between investors and
citizens. There is immense demand from developing
countries for technologies that can generate electricity
and reduce waste. Waste management in developing
countries frequently involves a wide sector of society,
from richer companies and neighbourhoods, to the so-
called ‘waste pickers,’ who collect or recycle waste as
their livelihood. Investment in waste-to-energy
therefore offers the possibility of achieving benefits for
companies, for local communities and for international
environmental policy concerns.
BOX 2: CONDITIONS INFLUENCING THE EMERGENCE AND
MAINTENANCE OF COLLABORATION
None 
Partial
Full 
Sources: Williamson, 1996; Weber, 1998: 34.
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Transactions costs of alternative 
High and
applicable to all
stakeholders 
High for most,
but not all
stakeholders 
Low
No collaboration No collaboration No collaboration
Collaboration
possible, but not
sustainable
Highly unlikely No collaboration
Sustained
Collaboration 
Collaboration
possible, but not
sustainable
No collaboration
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(i) The importance of assurance mechanisms
As noted above, assurance mechanisms are contracts,
laws, and expectations that ensure each side of a
partnership will cooperate. Two examples from the
Philippines and Thailand show their importance.
Between 2000 and 2001, Enron, the US-based
multinational energy investor, sought to develop a
$96m, 40MW energy plant using rice husks in the
province of Bulacan, in Luzon. Bulacan is one of the
most important rice-growing regions of the Philippines,
and the large quantity of rice husks produced as
agricultural waste offered an important opportunity
for using efficient incineration methods to convert
these to energy. However, the project failed when the
financiers learned how Enron had organized its
contracts for supplying rice husks. It had made
contracts with some 150 rice millers in order to supply
rice husks, and needed to maximize supply in order to
fuel its large 40MW plant. The rice millers quickly
discovered that Enron had no other suppliers of rice
husks, and so they were able increase the price, thus
eroding Enron’s profitability. Under these conditions,
the financiers withdrew their support.
An alternative outcome was illustrated by a
different case in Thailand. Between 2000 and 2004, a
Thai-owned company, AT Biopower, sought to build six
16MW power plants using rice husks in the central
plains of Thailand. The plan differed from Enron’s
project in the Philippines in many ways. First, the Thai
company sought to build a number of smaller power
plants, rather than one large 40MW plant. Secondly,
the investor used a variety of techniques to ensure that
the supply of rice husks remained constant – for
example, making contracts with just 20–30 rice millers
per power plant, rather than 150: and seeking to use
just 10-15% of their total rice husk production, rather
than 100%, as was the case in Bulacan. The power
plants therefore experienced lower transaction costs
through dealing with fewer rice millers than in the
Philippines, and did not rely on each miller’s total rice
husk production. Furthermore, millers are contracted
to produce a guaranteed quantity of husks: they are
fined if they fail to deliver, yet are also rewarded with
a yearly bonus if they achieve their target. All of these
techniques are assurance mechanisms to ensure that
partnerships between companies succeed. Yet they are
also crucial to ensuring the successful embedding of
new energy technologies.
(ii) The importance of transaction costs
Transaction costs are the costs of interacting with
partners, and usually refer to financial costs; time spent
negotiating; and problems of misunderstanding. The
best partnerships have fewest transaction costs. But
defining transaction costs may also include knowing
where to draw boundaries between partners, with
regard to which activities each is responsible for.
Examples from the Philippines show the need to
reduce costs with different partners.
Between 1996 and 1998, a US-based investor in
biomethanation sought to establish a new methane-
recovery and electricity generating plant in Ayala
Alabang near Manila in the Philippines. The investing
company used two techniques to reduce transaction
costs and maximize revenue for itself. First it
negotiated a contract with a local NGO to allow the
NGO to supply waste from pigs and cows in the region.
This was in both parties’ interests: the US investor did
not want to spend money on collecting waste (it had
no expertise in this area, and the transaction costs of
paying local collectors was too high); in addition the
NGO wanted to reduce waste locally. Secondly, the
NGO also negotiated another contract with the local
municipal government to buy the entire municipal
waste stream from the locality, and hired local waste
pickers to sort it into organic and inorganic waste.
Segregating the waste in this way is necessary in order
to extract the organic material for biomethanation,
and to make money from recycling inorganic material
such as metal and paper.
Unfortunately, this investment project failed for
several reasons. The most important was that local
landowners (including the municipality) increased the
rent payable on the power plant’s land because they
believed the project was more profitable than it was.
But in addition, the investing company quickly realized
that the stream of recyclable (inorganic) waste was
much smaller than they had anticipated because the
waste pickers and waste transporters were removing
the most valuable elements before they arrived at the
plant. The company quickly discovered that it could not
control the supply of recyclable waste, and so decided
to omit waste recycling from its business objectives. It
has since focused on biomethanation, composting and
carbon credits as its main profits, and has left most
recycling to the local people.
Using partners to reduce, rather than increase,
transaction costs, seems to be the lesson. In other
projects, local waste pickers have also been hired to
collect or segregate waste because it allows investment
projects to be accepted by local people as
opportunities rather than threats to their livelihoods. It
also allows investors to find areas of collaboration that
maximize mutual benefits, and the same US investor
has later persisted with other biomethanation projects.
In the Philippines, notably in Baguio in the northern
island of Luzon, and General Santos in Mindanao,
where local people are hired in order to undertake
waste sorting, but where the investor does not seek to
restrict the local people from recycling in ways that
benefit them. Much of this success comes from
defining boundaries around different business
activities: the investor focuses on biomethanation and
electricity generation; the local pickers on recycling.
This way, both sides can maximize their own profits
without undermining the partnership.
(iii) The importance of trust and transparency
But partnerships between investors and local
companies and citizens can easily be undermined by a
loss of trust, or worries about the new technology.
Local partnerships are not simply a pragmatic way of
introducing new environmental technologies; they are
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also seen by many people to be new business
opportunities that benefit some people more than
others, or as political acts. Often, the political
perceptions of partnerships are controlled by factors
outside the immediate control of investors. But what
can be done to make partnerships acceptable?
In Thailand, AT Biopower (mentioned above) tried
to build one 16MW rice husk power plant in central
province of Suphan Buri in 2000. This time, the
proposal caused widespread protests by local farmers,
who feared the plant would extract water, reduce
rainfall and cause pollution. There were even fears that
the plant would cause sterilization of anyone who
walked under the power cables. Protests against the
plant were reported in the national newspapers. These
fears were caused by general worries about
industrialization and pollution from power plants in
Thailand, and by (alleged) misinformation spread by
people who wanted to influence where the plant
would be located.
In the Philippines, investors in biomethanation
have also experienced opposition from national and
international NGOs who are opposed to waste-to-
energy in general. Environmentalists (and especially
the NGO Greenpeace) undertook a successful campaign
to ban incineration of urban waste, and to enforce
segregation of waste at source into organic and
inorganic. These steps were taken to reduce the vast
production of waste that is now overloading the
Philippines’ cities, and to resist incineration of waste.
But this activism has also included opposition to
biomethanation, even though it does not involve
incineration. Few activists understand the process of
electricity generation via anaerobic digestion, and
some believe any form of waste-to-energy is
unacceptable because it legitimizes the production of
waste. In the city of Baguio, one US investor faced
opposition from a local NGO who claimed that the
biomethanation technology would destroy people’s
livelihoods by preventing them from making compost.
There are, of course, many examples of political
activism undermining investment in new technologies.
But how can companies overcome local resistance? In
these case studies, investors took several steps to
improve local trust, and to seek win-win solutions. In
Suphan Buri, AT Biopower undertook an extensive
public education campaign, seeking to explain how
rice husks would lead to electricity generation without
significant pollution. The investor also committed
funds from the plant to support local community
development projects, and allowed citizens to monitor
pollution, with a commitment to pay compensation if
pollution exceeded limits.
In the biomethanation plants, the investors
deliberately tried to win local support by offering jobs
to the local waste pickers and other residents who
were concerned. This approach was also adopted in
India’s largest plant using biomethanation of municipal
waste. The plant, in the Uttar Pradesh town of
Lucknow, opened in 2003, generating some 5MW of
electricity from between 400 and 500 tons of organic
municipal waste a day. It is operated by an Asian-based
company with a variety of international shareholders.
The company also works in cooperation with an Indian
NGO, Exnora, which has pioneered the involvement of
waste pickers in urban waste management. When
asked why the company adopts this philanthropic
attitude to waste pickers, a representative said, ‘We
don’t want to upset the existing social system. Our
main income comes from power, fertilizer and carbon
credits. The recyclable income is not significant to us,
but it is significant to society … we are not depriving
people of livelihoods’.
But this active involvement of waste pickers in
partnerships between investors and citizens is fragile,
and can be controlled by the publicity or preferences
of different companies. In the Indian city of Chennai
(Madras), an Australian investor is seeking to build a
waste-to-energy plant based on pyrolysis of urban
waste. This technology has received much criticism
within India on the grounds that it may release too
many pollutants (a claim the investor denies), and that
it is an insufficiently short-term solution to the creation
of urban waste. To conduct pyrolysis successfully, the
company has to collect the entire municipal waste
stream, including papers and plastics, and burn these
to gain sufficient calorific values in the waste. The
company does undertake some limited recycling (for
example, of metals), but there are fewer opportunities
for local waste pickers to be involved. The investor
defends this position by saying it is happy for waste
pickers not to be involved, as using labour this way is
not healthy or just. Critics suggest that this statement
is simply a way to protect the supply of waste for
pyrolysis.
The implication of these examples is that governing
public happiness by means of partnerships between
local people and investors can be very difficult and
beyond the control of investors. Most companies have
tried to maximize public trust by proving information
about the new technologies, and by including many
different people in the production process. But some
technologies – such as pyrolysis – must control more of
the waste stream and therefore provide fewer
opportunities for local involvement. Furthermore, in
the political battles surrounding the choice of waste-
to-energy technology, statements are often not linked
to localities, but come from national or international
NGOs and activists.
Lessons for building partnerships
for technology transfer
So what are the lessons for using partnerships to
transfer environmental technology to new locations?
How can collaboration reduce the costs of investors,
and increase the success of environmental technologies
in rapidly industrializing countries? The discussion
above suggests five general points.
(i) Be feasible: Most examples of successful partnerships
are based on targets that are achievable and that can
form a successful template for further projects. Enron’s
failed rice husk project in Bulacan in the Philippines
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failed because it sought to generate 40MW. But AT
Biopower in Thailand has proved that smaller plants
(of 16MW) can work. Similarly, forming partnerships
with fewer numbers of partners may be more
achievable than working with larger numbers.
(ii) Maximize assurance mechanisms: Assurance
mechanisms are the devices – such as contracts and
understandings – that keep both partners together in a
partnership. In Thailand, AT Biopower successfully
created incentives to ensure that the suppliers of rice
husks honoured their contracts by making sure the
power plant was not dependent on any one supplier,
and by giving cash bonuses to suppliers who
performed well. In the Philippines, investors in
biomethanation sought successful collaboration with
local citizens by ensuring that both parties had
something to gain from the completion of power
plants (i.e. citizens benefited from waste reduction and
the opportunity to profit from recycling; the company
gained from having access to the organic waste).
(iii) Minimize transaction costs: Transaction costs are
the costs of interaction that can make or break a
partnership. In the Philippines, investors in
biomethanation realized that transaction costs would
be reduced once clear boundaries were established
around the ownership of and participation in the
waste treatment process. Successful assurance
mechanisms can also mean reduced transaction costs,
as both sides have incentives to perform. Reduced
transaction costs usually mean understanding what
aspects of the partnership are most important for one
party, and specializing on these, rather than assuming
all aspects of interaction will be successful.
(iv) Be aware of politics: Political activism and
environmental campaigns may get in the way of
successful collaboration. If companies establish
successful assurance mechanisms and low transaction
costs, then there may be a small chance of political
activism getting in the way of partnerships. But
political activism may emerge for factors beyond
companies’ control, and may result from more general
worries about the role of foreign investors in the
domestic economy; the role of an allegedly corrupt
local government in favouring one company above
others; or fears about technology and environment
that may or may not be well founded. In such cases,
some companies have responded by trying to control
their own image. The Australian investor in Chennai,
for example, sought to legitimize pyrolysis by
delegitimizing using waste pickers in waste
management. In the Philippines, some activists unfairly
accused biomethanation of being another form of
incineration. In these cases, companies have responded
by engaging in gentle dialogue with critics, and by
including some element of community development
into their projects. In many ways, being aware of
politics is a broader way of maximizing assurance
mechanisms and minimizing transaction costs.
(v) Work with others: Finally, partnerships often result
not only from the hard work of specific companies or
business managers, but from the coincidence of various
local, national and international factors. In the
Philippines, a national law requiring all municipal
waste to be segregated may help partnerships emerge
between investors who want to build biomethanation
plants and local citizens who are worried about
increasing waste totals. In Lucknow, India, the local
government had a role in establishing a new
biomethanation power plant by urging companies to
adopt a positive attitude to hiring local waste pickers.
National and local NGOs may also seek to engage
constructively with companies – for example, the NGO
Exnora in India has established beneficial relationships
with some waste management companies. For
environmental policy, involving different actors in
business, society, and government increases the
chances of cooperation, and decreases dependency on
any one actor. Box 3 summarizes some potential roles
played by different actors.
Rethinking capacity-building for
technology transfer
Finally, what are the lessons for policy approaches to
technology transfer? And what can the EGTT and
UNFCCC do to adopt them?
This paper has argued that formal approaches to
capacity-building under the UNFCCC have tended to
emphasize actions by governments and large donors,
especially within innovation and development of
technology, rather than ways in which non-state actors
can implement technology diffusion. Of course,
innovation and development remain important, as do
activities such as increasing fair trade policies,
protecting intellectual property rights, or increasing
public access to, and information about, technologies.
But capacity-building, and technology transfer in
general, should not just be defined in these terms.
According to the UNFCCC (2003a: 4), capacity-
building is ‘transferring experience, knowledge, skills
and practices’. This paper argues that capacity-building
is more than transferring such factors, and should
include greater attention to strengthening existing
factors that allow actors to reach agreements for
adopting technologies. In essence, this requires seeking
ways for investing companies to recover costs on a
long-term basis, and appreciating that technologies are
seen as appropriate by local users. Unlike governments
and environmental organizations, investors and
communities do not always perceive ‘technology
transfer’ as an activity in its own right. Understanding
what motivates such actors to get involved in activities
that assist technology transfer is an important way to
build capacity for technology transfer. Capacity-
building may also include reducing the transaction
costs of collaboration, and diversifying forms of
assurance mechanisms for partnerships (see Box 3). The
8 Partnerships for Technology Transfer
EGTT can diversify its work on capacity-building and
enabling environments by acknowledging how
different actors may see these, and facilitating ways for
communities and investors to form partnerships to
assist technology diffusion.
A further need for capacity-building is to
acknowledge that ‘communities’ are more diverse than
is commonly described. UNEP (2004: 5) has written that
‘community participation calls for clear commitment
and involvement of all members of a community in
various joint activities (with local governments)’. But –
as shown in the case studies – partnerships are rarely
formed with all community members, and each act of
collaboration has involved winners and losers within
communities. Governments may seek to educate
communities as a whole, or to supply technologies such
as solar lanterns to each household. But seeking
contractual arrangements or commercial partnerships
between communities and investors will rarely involve
all citizens. Recognizing the diversity of needs and
actors within communities may help capacity-building
for technology transfer by identifying different
opportunities for appropriate technology.
Partnerships between investors and local
companies and citizen groups clearly involve various
costs and learning procedures that may get in the way
of investing in new environmental technologies. But
for some investment and technologies, engaging with
other parties may be the only way to make progress.
The examples discussed above show that successful
partnerships might reduce investors’ costs, and increase
the relevance of new technologies for local people in
developing countries. The EGTT and UNFCCC can assist
technology transfer further by helping end users and
investors form partnerships for technology diffusion.
Partnerships for Technology Transfer 9
BOX 3: BUILDING CAPACITY FOR CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER VIA PARTNERSHIPS
BETWEEN COMMUNITIES AND INVESTORS
Actions for national governments
• National legislation such as the Philippines’ Clean Air Act and Solid Waste Act, which seek to attract 
investment in ‘clean’ technologies; educate residents about waste segregation; and prepare waste for 
treatment.
• National programmes for building investment in renewable energy technologies such as Thailand’s Small 
Producer Programme and Biomass Programme, which offer an initial subsidy for plants to invest in new 
technologies to use waste products for electricity generation.
Actions for local governments
• Seek strong action and united support for projects that integrate waste management with generation of 
electricity.
• Seek support from national or local NGOs to ensure any investment does not result in costly disputes.
• Ensure that benefits of new technology schemes are seen to be distributed locally, such as access to the 
electricity generated, or by-products of waste segregation.
Actions for businesses and investors
• Seek collaboration with local NGOs or citizen groups who may be able to point to synergies and 
complementarities in aims that may lead to cost-saving opportunities.
• Allow time and money for educating residents about the objectives of the investment and technology, 
including frank discussion about who wins and loses.
• Avoid depending on a limited number of suppliers or collaborators, as they may be willing to exploit this 
dependency later on.
Actions for citizen groups and NGOs
• Seek collaboration with businesses with which there may be complementary aims, as they may provide 
commercial incentives for public-policy objectives such as waste collection, or training of unskilled workers.
• Participate in training and education if possible.
Actions for all actors
• Seek public debate about public–private collaboration, how private and public objectives may offer 
complementarity, how past experience may shape current perceptions of collaboration, and how 
Endnotes
1 The EGTT was established by Parties at the seventh Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-7) held in Marrakesh in November
2001.  The objective of the EGTT is to enhance the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Convention, inter alia by analysing
and identifying ways to facilitate and advance technology transfer activities and making recommendations to the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).
2 The CDM Adaptation Fund is based on the extraction of 2% of the value of Certified Emission Reduction Units achieved by each
CDM project.
3 http://ttclear.unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/.
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The Programme regularly holds meetings, study groups, workshops and conferences which bring together experts
from differing perspectives who would not often meet in any other forum. Academics and industry, government
and NGO representatives benefit from the Programme’s neutral and non-confrontational forum for debate and
networking that helps promote understanding of different approaches to key international issues.  Meetings are
often held under the Chatham House Rule of Confidentiality to encourage a more open exchange of views. 
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